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Abstract 
In the United States, people who need long-term care (LTC) face a system with large gaps in care, which 
they must rely on friends and family to fill. Medicaid finances the majority of paid LTC, but people must 
exhaust their resources to qualify. Medicare and private health insurance do not cover LTC, and the private 
market for long-term care insurance is failing. Unpaid family and friends provide most long-term services, 
but the value of their services is rarely reflected in debates about LTC financing and delivery. Beyond the 
value of the services, this system has costs to the economy, as spouses and adult children reduce paid 
work to care for their loved ones. As the population ages and families are less able to shoulder the burden 
of LTC, the current system may be unable to meet the growing need without an alternative, sustainable 
financing mechanism. 
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BACKGROUND
Long-term care (LTC), sometimes referred to as long-term services 
and supports, can be defined as a continuum of medical and social 
services designed to support individuals who need extended help with 
“activities of daily living,” such as bathing and dressing. We distinguish 
LTC from post-acute care, in which similar services are provided on a 
short-term basis after hospitalization. Although they are often delivered 
in the same facilities, long-term and post-acute care are financed in very 
different ways, as shown on page 2.  
The current system for financing LTC relies heavily on informal 
(unpaid) caregivers, many of whom are themselves socioeconomically 
and medically vulnerable. Medicaid is the primary payer for formal LTC, 
accounting for over half of national spending in 2017 (Figure 1). 
However, Medicaid only becomes available after individuals have 
exhausted their financial resources. Medicare does not cover LTC, with 
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In the United States, people who need long-term care (LTC) face a system with large gaps in care, which they must rely 
on friends and family to fill. Medicaid finances the majority of paid LTC, but people must exhaust their resources to qualify. 
Medicare and private health insurance do not cover LTC, and the private market for long-term care insurance is failing. 
Unpaid family and friends provide most long-term services, but the value of their services is rarely reflected in debates about 
LTC financing and delivery. Beyond the value of the services, this system has costs to the economy, as spouses and adult 
children reduce paid work to care for their loved ones. As the population ages and families are less able to shoulder the 
burden of LTC, the current system may be unable to meet the growing need without an alternative, sustainable financing 
mechanism.
Total National LTC 
Spending = $364.9 billion
■  Out-of-Pocket
■  Private Insurance
■  Other Public and Private
■  Medicaid
11%
20%
52%16%
Figure 1. LTC spending by payer, 2017. 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services 
Enrollment and Spending (April 2019)
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most post-acute care limited to less than 100 days. The long-term care 
insurance market is small and contracting, covering very few Americans 
at relatively high premiums. Sixteen percent of formal care is paid 
out-of-pocket. At a median hourly cost of $22 for a home health aide, 
and a median annual cost of more than $100,000 for a private room in 
a nursing home, most people will not have the resources to self-finance 
their LTC needs. 
This brief reviews how LTC is financed in the U.S. It draws on evidence 
characterizing the current system, and demonstrates a need for 
alternative, sustainable solutions to protect against the unpredictable, 
potentially catastrophic risk of needing LTC. 
WHO BEARS THE RISK FOR LONG-TERM CARE?
While individuals of all ages are at risk for needing LTC, this need grows 
with age. By 2055, nearly 90 million people in the U.S. will be aged 65 and 
older, and the population aged 85 and older will more than double.1 The 
number of older Americans with severe LTC needs is estimated to increase 
140 percent between 2015 and 2055, reaching 15.1 million.2 
But this risk is not distributed equally, even among people 65 and over.3 
One-third of them may never need LTC, while a fifth will need it for more 
than five years. Need also varies by subpopulation; for example, women 
need care longer (3.7 years on average) than men (2.2 years). 
However, in our present system, the financial and physical risks families face 
is not only a function of needing LTC, but also of needing to provide care.4 
Hoffman (2016) points out that current LTC policy fails to account for the 
risk of becoming responsible for someone else’s care, which she terms “next-
friend” risk. Next-friends, or those who directly provide or arrange LTC, 
take on responsibilities that may threaten their own long-term health and 
financial security. Even more troubling is that informal caregivers tend to be 
those already more vulnerable: caregiving responsibilities are heavily borne 
by women, certain minorities, and the poor.5 Hoffman argues that social 
policy has expanded next-friend risk by reinforcing a structure of long-term 
care that relies on informal caregiving. Although people have long relied on 
family members for care, current LTC policy has intensified and cemented 
this role.
MEDICAID IS THE PRIMARY PAYER FOR  
LONG-TERM CARE
Because long-term care is not considered “medical care” as defined 
in federal legislation, neither Medicare nor private health insurance 
cover LTC. Although not intended to be a long-term care program, 
Medicaid finances 52 percent of all paid LTC, and functions as a critical 
safety net when long-term disabilities occur. However, this coverage is 
limited, ultimately falling short for people who need LTC. Coverage and 
spending vary significantly by state, with the highest-spending states 
averaging six times more than the lowest spending states ($3,000 vs. 
$500 per low-income resident).6 
Hoffman (2015; 2016) details how Medicaid emerged as the primary 
payer of LTC, and how its design affects the way care is financed and 
delivered.4,7 For instance, to qualify for Medicaid, individuals must have low 
income and limited savings, or exhaust almost all of their resources until 
they qualify. As a result, only the poorest Americans have LTC coverage, 
except for the relatively limited number who have private policies. 
Initially, Medicaid had an “institutional bias” – favoring the provision of 
LTC in licensed nursing homes (a mandatory benefit that states must 
cover to receive federal matching funds) over home care (an optional 
benefit). This structure incentivized long-term institutional care, and set 
the stage for the current patchwork coverage for home and community-
based care. Nonetheless, Hoffman explains, this relieved some of 
the burden on family and friends. In a recent study of the effects of 
expanding Medicaid eligibility by changing “spend-down” provisions, 
Mommaerts (2018) found that fewer elderly beneficiaries resided with 
their children, and more resided in nursing homes.8 This effect was 
concentrated among individuals aged 80 and older, with lower income, 
and those who have difficulty caring for themselves. A subpopulation of 
moderate-income people may have moved away from coresidence and 
into independent home care, but the study was not designed to assess 
changes in home and community-based care. 
In recent decades, Medicaid has “rebalanced” its services away from 
institutions and toward home and community-based services. This 
shift reflects patients’ preference to remain at home, as well as the 
Post-acute care (short-term, rehabilitative) Long-term care
Payers Medicare (more than 80%)
Other (Medicaid, private insurance, out-of-pocket)
Medicaid
Private LTC insurance
Out-of-pocket spending
Informal, unpaid care
Services/Location of care LTC hospitals
Inpatient rehabilitation
Home and community-based services
Skilled nursing facilities/nursing homes
Assisted living facilities
Table.  Financing and Delivery of Long-Term and Post-Acute Care
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Figure 2.  Proportion of Total Medicaid LTC Spending on Institutional Services and Home and 
Community-Based Services, 2000–2016
Source: MACPAC, Home and Community Based-Services
Institutional Services Home and Community-Based Services
Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C. (1999) that avoidable 
institutionalization of persons with disabilities violates the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.7 Subsequently, the share of Medicaid LTC 
spending on home and community-based services has consistently 
increased since the 1980s, surpassing institutional care in 2013 (Figure 
2).9 The Affordable Care Act included financial incentives for states 
to expand Medicaid coverage of community LTC, and between 2011 
and 2015, 18 states received more than $2.4 billion in enhanced federal 
funding.10 In 2016, home and community-based services were 57 
percent of total LTC expenditures. However, coverage of these services 
remains optional, and funding varies significantly by state.
As a result, most people receiving LTC live in private homes or 
community settings, including many individuals with severe functional 
limitations.11 While the shift to home offers considerable benefits to 
care-recipients, Hoffman explains, rebalancing has cemented the 
obligations of friends and family to fill in gaps in care, often with little 
support to do so.4
Recently, some states have experimented with using Medicaid 
funds more flexibly to pay for family members to provide care. Coe 
and colleagues (2019) studied a demonstration program that gave 
Medicaid beneficiaries an allowance equal to the cost of home health 
agency care, with a choice of paying for agency care or paying family 
members to provide care.12 They found that family involvement in 
home care significantly decreased inpatient health care utilization and 
Medicaid spending on inpatient care. They also found improvements 
in health outcomes, including significant decreases in infection rates 
and development of bed sores and shortness of breath. These findings 
suggest paid family care could both increase beneficiary health while 
lowering utilization and costs.
THE MARKET FOR PRIVATE LONG-TERM  
CARE INSURANCE IS FAILING 
Private LTC insurance has been available since the 1980s, but the 
market is relatively small and contracting. In 2014, 7.2 million people 
were covered by private LTC insurance, about 5 million of whom were 
65 and older (11 percent of all elderly adults).13,14 Wealthier people are 
more likely to be covered, but the coverage rate among the wealthy 
is still fairly low; in 2014, only a quarter of adults 65 and older with at 
least $1 million in household wealth were covered. By contrast, only 8 
percent of older adults with wealth between $100,000 and $500,000 
had coverage. 
The private market for LTC insurance has unraveled in recent years. 
Despite the growing need, the number of new stand-alone individual 
LTC insurance policies has fallen from 372,000 in 2004 to just under 
70,000 in 2017. Likewise, the number of insurers offering the coverage 
has diminished from slightly over 100 to about a dozen. Premium rates 
for newly issued policies have risen as the remaining insurers adjust their 
pricing.15,16 
Surveys indicate that people are often reluctant to purchase LTC 
insurance because they underestimate their future LTC needs, 
mistakenly believe Medicare or private health insurance will cover their 
LTC expenses, have concerns about insurer solvency, and/or believe 
premiums are too high.17 Even at actuarially fair prices, Pauly (1990) 
notes that risk-averse buyers who are rational and well-informed may 
still choose not to purchase LTC insurance, if they view family members 
as an alternative source of care.18 Demand may be low, Pauly argues, 
because the main consequence of LTC insurance is to enhance the 
expected value of a buyer’s estate.
But LTC insurance may have other 
intergenerational benefits. Coe and colleagues 
(2015) found that people with LTC insurance 
use less informal caregiving.19 Adult children 
are less likely to live with or near parents with 
LTC insurance and more likely to work full-time, 
suggesting that economic gains from private 
LTC insurance could accrue to the younger 
generation. 
WHY ARE LONG-TERM CARE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE RATES SO LOW?
People often attribute low purchase rates of 
private LTC insurance to a reduced demand 
because of the availability of Medicaid coverage. 
While this so-called “crowd out” occurs, 
evidence suggests that it has only a modest 
impact on demand. For example, Brown, Coe, 
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and Finkelstein (2007) estimated that even the most stringent state 
Medicaid eligibility requirements, applied nationally, would only increase 
the demand for private LTC insurance from 9.1 percent to 11.8 percent. 
The authors conclude, “The vast majority of households would still find 
it unattractive to purchase private insurance.”20 A more recent study by 
Kim (2017) modeled the decision to purchase LTC insurance and found 
that eliminating Medicaid would increase demand only slightly (by 5.3 
percent), but would have a larger effect on savings, increasing median 
assets by 15.3 percent.21 
Medical underwriting by insurers may also contribute to low coverage 
rates. In any voluntary market, insurers use underwriting to price risks 
accordingly and to avoid adverse selection. One study of two LTC 
insurers found that they denied up to 24 percent of applications based 
on medical underwriting; a simulation of underwriting estimated that 
40 percent of the general target population would be denied.22 Rapid 
advances in predictive testing and changes in health technology (for 
example, biomarkers that can predict risk of developing Alzheimer’s up to 
20 years before symptoms) may enhance underwriting that could narrow 
the LTC insurance market even further.16 
There may be an even more important reason for low LTC insurance 
purchase rates: the behavioral economic principle of “narrow framing,” or 
the tendency to make decisions in isolation. Gottlieb and Mitchell (2019) 
found that, all else being equal, individuals who are subject to narrow 
framing are between 25 and 66 percent less likely to buy LTC insurance 
than average.23 
INFORMAL CAREGIVERS PROVIDE THE  
BULK OF LONG-TERM CARE, AT AN  
ENORMOUS COST
Absent public and private coverage, most people needing LTC rely solely 
on informal caregivers (unpaid friends and family members) rather than 
on paid services. The risk taken on by loved ones caring for a friend or 
relative intensifies the scale of the LTC problem in the U.S. In 2013, the 
estimated value of these unpaid, often unnoticed contributions was about 
$470 billion, based on caregivers providing 18 hours of care per week at 
an average wage of $12.51 per hour.24 Other estimates, which differ based 
on methodology and definitions, include $199 billion (2009), $234 billion 
(2011), and $522 billion (2011-2012).25,26,27
The range of estimates reflects the difficult and complicated task 
of placing a value on informal caregiving. Most estimates rely on 
straightforward methods such as multiplying the hours of informal 
care provided by the wage of a formal home health worker. However, 
monetary losses are just the beginning. Informal caregiving today is more 
complex, costly, stressful, and demanding than ever.25 Although caregiving 
can be an enriching, meaningful experience, informal caregivers often 
experience permanent harm to their health, careers, and relationships. 
Coe, Skira, and Larson (2018) estimate a more comprehensive cost to 
an individual caregiver that accounts for the value of lost leisure time, 
potential impacts on future employability and wages, and any intrinsic 
benefits such as fulfilling a familial duty.  
The authors find that the cost to a daughter caring for her elderly mother 
for two years ranges from $144,000 to $200,000, depending on the 
mother’s health. The median cost was $180,000, seven times the estimate 
that only considers foregone wages. This suggests that the costs of 
providing informal care to a daughter’s well-being are about the same as 
the cost of a semi-private bed in a nursing home (about $170,000 for two 
years in 2017). As Medicaid programs continue shifting LTC to home and 
community-based services, with variable coverage and waiting lists, people 
may need to rely more on informal supports, at great cost to families. 
Relying on families to “pick up the slack” presupposes that informal care 
can substitute for formal care, which has been found in a number of 
studies.29,30,31 However, formal care can also complement informal care, 
especially in low-income populations. In a study of Medicaid beneficiaries 
in Texas, Moudini and colleagues (2012) found that more formal home 
care hours were not associated with fewer informal care hours; in fact, 
the hours of informal care increased as the number of formal care hours 
increased.32 The authors suggest that the need for care may drive both 
forms of care. Formal home care may allow informal caregivers to focus 
on different tasks that need attention as the beneficiary’s needs change. 
CONCLUSION
America’s LTC problem might be hidden from public eye, but it affects 
all of us, and significantly impacts how public dollars are spent. As the 
population ages and rates of disability rise, the current system’s failure to 
meet the needs of those who require LTC, and their loved ones, will only 
intensify. 
In the absence of other viable public or private options, Medicaid will 
continue to be the major mechanism for financing LTC for millions of 
Americans. As Medicaid continues rebalancing its services, the focus 
should be on streamlining access to home and community-based care, 
supporting informal caregivers including with pay, and addressing gaps 
in coverage through comprehensive or incremental reforms. Private 
insurance can and will likely play a complementary role, but even 
proponents of private options admit that building future policy around a 
private market will leave most Americans unprotected.33 
The lack of protections for individuals who need and provide LTC, 
combined with demographic trajectories and projected needs, point 
to the urgency around pursuing policies more sensitive to the risks and 
financial insecurity individuals and families face. In the end, each of us, or 
the people we love, will need LTC, and creating a sustainable financial 
solution to this problem will benefit all. 
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